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Redressing Impunity for Human Rights
Violations: The Universal Declaration and the
Search for Accountability
CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER
I. INTRODUCTION
This year celebrates the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights,' a document that is regarded both as the
wellspring and cornerstone of modern international human rights law.
The Universal Declaration, though not intended to be legally binding,
aims to set "a common standard of achievement for all peoples and na-
tions."2 And that it surely does. Its thirty articles cover a raft of human
rights and fundamental freedoms, ranging from the liberty and security
of the person, equality before the law, due process, prohibitions against
torture and arbitrary interference with privacy, to civil and political
rights that protect freedom of movement, asylum, expression, con-
science and religion, and assembly. There are in addition economic and
social rights, such as the rights to work and equal pay and to social se-
curity and education.
The Universal Declaration clearly is not an enforceable interna-
tional instrument. Yet, the fact remains that its contents have subse-
quently become regarded as binding customary international law,3 or as
embodying general principles of law, 4 or as conventional law by virtue
of being codified through specific provisions in specific international
treaty instruments.5
Nevertheless, underpinning the proclaimed rights in the Universal
Declaration is a critical provision that tends to be passed over in most
treatments of human rights law. This provision is Article 8, which in
1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III 1948), Dec. 10, 1948.
2. Id. preamble.
3. See RICHARD B. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW,
POLICY AND PRACTICE 86-163 (1991).
4. Hurst Hannum, Human Rights, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 138 (Christopher C. Joyner ed., 1997).
5. See OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 1002 (R.Y. Jennings & A.D. Watts eds.,
9th ed. 1992); MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 248-49 (1993).
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full emphatically asserts the following: "Everyone has the right to an
effective remedy by the competent national tribunal for acts violating
the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law." 6
This is the effective remedies provision that explicitly intends to protect
the rights of the victim. Each person therefore possesses and can exer-
cise the right to obtain redress for harm done by public or private
agents to him or her. The premise here is that no person is above the
law. Every person should have recourse to protection under the law, to
equal protection against discrimination of his or her fundamental hu-
man rights, and to justice in seeking juridical remedies under the law.
Furthermore, in the event that the fundamental human rights of a per-
son are violated, there remains the overarching right to justice. States
are obligated to investigate those violations, take appropriate measures
against the perpetrators, ensure that they are prosecuted, and furnish
the victims with effective remedies.
Such remedies for victims have not, in fact, often been attained.
Human rights have been grossly violated, on massive scales, usually
leaving as stark legacies the scars of profound suffering for victims and
scabs of impunity for perpetrators. This realization points up the main
purpose of this paper, namely, to examine the notion of allowing impu-
nity for serious violators of fundamental human rights as opposed to
the obligation of obtaining effective remedies for victims as affirmed
under Article 8 of the Universal Declaration. To address this theme,
Part II section briefly treats the scope of impunity, as it appraises the
contemporary system of international criminal law that prohibits im-
punity for human rights violations and supplies the legal basis for gov-
ernments to comply with and enforce the obligation for juridical redress
in Article 8 of the Universal Declaration. Part III deals with the nature
of impunity, specifically by exploring the rationales concerning why
governments do so little in prosecuting and punishing persons who have
committed the most horrendous of crimes. The availability under na-
tional and international law of various accountability mechanisms for
bringing alleged perpetrators to justice is treated in Part IV, as is how
the need for justice squares with the need for national reconciliation.
Part V appraises the prospects for obtaining Article 8 effective remedies
through competent tribunals (inclusive of international courts), as
guided by principles designed to ensure restitution, compensation and
rehabilitation for victims of gross violations of human rights and fun-
damental freedoms, and the final section proffers some conclusions for
reflective consideration.
6. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 1, art. 8.
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II. THE SCOPE OF IMPUNITY
In the last half century, violent internal conflicts and tyrannical re-
gimes have victimized millions of people throughout the world. 7 One
authoritative report estimates that from World War II through 1996, at
least 220 non-international conflicts involving civil war or oppressive
regimes may have killed as many as 86 million people.8 That victimiza-
tion has included the most serious violations of fundamental human
rights - genocide, crimes against humanity, non-juridical executions,
torture, arbitrary arrests and unlawful detentions.
The scope of these high crimes is monstrous indeed. Yet, there
have been relatively few prosecutions and only scarce accountability,
either nationally or internationally for these grave violations of human
rights and the resultant pervasive suffering. In fact, only a handful of
remedies for these massive human rights violations have been at-
tempted, and these have come as piecemeal and ad hoc offerings mainly
during the past decade.9 Two international investigatory commissions o
7. Rudolph Rummel has recently calculated that during the present century, civil
wars, internal conflicts and tyrannical regimes have caused some 170 million deaths, as
compared to 33 million persons killed in international military conflicts. RUDOLPH J.
RUMMEL, DEATH BY GOVERNMENT 9 (1994).
8. Jennifer Balint, An Empirical Study of Conflict, Conflict Victimization, and Legal
Redress, REINING IN IMPUNITY FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES AND SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF
FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS, 14 NOUVELLES ETUDES PENALES 1998 101, 107 (Christo-
pher C. Joyner ed. 1998) [hereinafter REIGNING IN IMPUNITY]. See also M. Cherif Bas-
siouni, Considerations on Peace and Justice and the Imperative of Accountability for In-
ternational Crimes and Consistent and Widespread Violations of Fundamental Human
Rights, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, at 10 (Autumn 1996) [hereinafter Bassiouni], re-
printed in REINING IN IMPUNITY, at 45, 46.
9. See Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need
to Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 11 (1997).
10. For Bosnia, see Report of the Special Rapporteur to the Commission on Human
Rights of 28 August 1992, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/1992/S-1/9; Report of the Special Rapporteur
to the Commission on Human Rights of 27 October 1992, U.N. Doc. ECN.411992/S-10; Re-
port of the Special Rapporteur to the Commission of Human Rights to the Forty Seventh
Session of the General Assembly of 17 November 1992, U.N. Doc. A147/666-S/24809; Report
of the Special Rapporteur to the Commission on Human Rights to the Economic and Social
Council of 10 February 1993, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/50. See The Final Report of the
Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992),
U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (1994) [hereinafter Final Report of
the Commission of Experts]; Final Report, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., Annexes, U.N. Doc.
S/1994/674/Add.2 (1994). See also M. Cherif Bassiouni, The United Nations Commission
of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), 88 AM. J. INT'L
L. 784-805 (1994); M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Commission of Experts Established Pursuant
to Security Council Resolution 780: Investigating Violations of International Humanitar-
ian Law in the Former Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. L. F. 279-340 (1994). For Rwanda, see Letter
Dated 1 October 1994 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Secu-
rity Council, S/1994/1125, transmitting the Commission of Experts' Preliminary Report
(Oct. 1, 1994); Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda, UN Doc.
1998
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and two special tribunals were respectively established for the former
Yugoslavia 1 and Rwanda. 12 An international truth commission was
held for El Salvador, although it failed to produce any prosecutions. 13
Two national prosecution programs were undertaken following the civil
conflicts in Ethiopia 14 and Rwanda. 15 Certain national prosecutions
were undertaken in Argentina, 16 and a national inquiry commission
was set up in Chile.17 In South Africa, a special body known as the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established, which may yet
produce some prosecutions.' 8 Finally, some East and Central European
countries adopted special "lustration" laws to preclude select people in
the former communist regimes from holding public office, or partici-
pating in politics.' 9 Ideally, impunity for these most heinous of acts -
E/CN.411995/7 (June 28, 1994); Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda, UN
Doc. E/CN.4t1995/12 (Aug. 12, 1994).
11. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
adopted at New York, May 25, 1993, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg.,
at 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), 32 I.L.M. 1159 [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
12. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, adopted at New York,
Nov. 8, 1994, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955
(1994), 33 I.L.M. 1598 [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
13. See FROM MADNESS TO HOPE: THE 12-YEAR WAR IN EL SALVADOR, REPORT OF
THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON THE TRUTH FOR EL SALVADOR, U.N. Doc. S/25500
(1993).
14. See Girma Wakjira, National Prosecution: The Ethiopian Experience, in REINING
IN IMPUNITY, supra note 8, at 189.
15. See generally United Nations Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda Status
Report, The Administration of Justice in Post-Genocide Rwanda (June 1996). See also
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Prosecuting Genocide in Rwanda: The ICTR and
National Trials 47-66 (1997).
16. See NUNCA MAS, INFORME DE LA COMISION SOBRE LA DESAPARICION DE PERSONAS
(1985); CAROLOS SANTIAGO NINO, RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL (1996).
17. See REPORT OF THE CHILEAN NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION (Philip E. Berryman trans., 1993). See Edward C. Snyder, The Dirty Le-
gal War: Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Chile 1973-1995, 2 TULSA J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 253 (1995).
18. See Ziyad Motala, The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, the
Constitution and International Law, 28 COMP. & INT. L. J. S. AFRICA 338 (1995); Lynn
Berat & Yossi Shain, Retribution or Truth-telling in South Africa? Legacies of the Transi-
tional Phase, 20 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 163 (1995).
19. See generally TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: How EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON
WITH FORMER REGIMES (Neil J. Kritz ed., Vol. III. Law, Rulings and Reports 1995); Maria
Lon, Lustration and Truth Claims: Unfinished Revolutions in Central Europe, 20 L. &
SOC. INQUIRY 1, 117 (1995); Adrenne M. Quill, To Prosecute or Not to Prosecute: Problems
Encountered in the Prosecution of Former Communist Officials in Germany, Czechoslova-
kia, and the Czech Republic, 7 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 165 (1996); Mark S. Ellis,
Purging the Past: The Current State of Lustration Laws in the Former Communist Bloc,
59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 181 (1996); Ved Nanda, Civil and Political Sanctions as an
Accountability Mechanism for Massive Violations of Human Rights, in REINING IN
VOL. 26:4
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war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity - should not be tol-
erated under any circumstances. In an ideal world, governments would
adopt international agreements in which they pledge not to use impu-
nity from prosecution by international tribunals as a bargaining chip in
negotiations to facilitate a transfer of power from one government to a
successor regime. But, we do not live in an ideal world. Political consid-
erations are inevitable - indeed, they are inescapable - and will affect
the international response to high crimes involving human rights viola-
tions.
The rather modest efforts at fact-finding, prosecution and punish-
ment hardly measure up to the massive human rights victimization
that has occurred since World War II. Indeed, the vast extent of human
rights deprivations that has taken so many millions of lives profoundly
violates the inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of
persons affirmed for protection in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. 20 No less egregious, though, is that nearly all the persons who
perpetrated these gross violations of human rights have gone unpun-
ished. This situation personifies the pervasive practice of impunity, of
letting the guilty get away with murder, literally, scot-free.
III. THE NATURE OF IMPUNITY
One authoritative United Nations rapporteur has defined impunity
as "the impossibility, de jure or de facto, of bringing the perpetrators of
human rights violations to account - whether in criminal, civil, ad-
ministrative or disciplinary proceedings - since they are not subject to
any inquiry that might lead to them being accused, arrested, tried and
if found guilty, convicted." 21 Impunity, then, means exemption or free-
IMPUNITY, supra note 8, at 313.
20. To wit, relevant provisions in the Universal Declaration that were grossly vio-
lated would, inter alia, include the following: "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and
security of person." (article 3); "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment." (article 5); "Everyone has the right to recognition
everywhere as a person before the law." (article 6); "All are equal before the law and are
entitled without discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal
protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any in-
citement to such discrimination." (article 7); and, "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
arrest, detention or exile." (article 9). Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note
1.
21. Question of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Violations of Human Rights (civil and
political rights): Revised final Report prepared by Mr. Joinet, Pursuant to Sub-
Commission Resolution 1996/119, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, 49th Sess., Item 10, (June 26, 1997) UN Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20, at 3, reprinted in REINING IN IMPUNITY, supra note 8, at 501-24.
[hereinafter the Joinet Principles] (subsequent citations refer to the reprinted text).
1998
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dom from punishment and connotes the lack of effective remedies for
victims of crimes. Within the context of human rights law, impunity
implies the lack of or failure to apply remedies for victims of human
rights violations. 22
In the grand scheme of things, one might be tempted to ask, "So
what? Why should the international community care about impunity
and its relevance for the human rights situation in a particular state?
Why should that situation involving the internal affairs of a some state
be a grave concern of other peoples, in other states?" The answers to
these queries are bound up in the kinds of crimes and the degree of
violations that escape prosecution. Usually these acts are the vilest of
human rights deprivations. They include violations of the right to life,
i.e., extralegal executions, "disappearances," and massacres; violations
of personal integrity, including torture and other physical injuries; and,
unlawful restrictions on personal liberty, such as arbitrary detention,
illicit search and seizure, and unwarranted arrest.
In short, these are acts that violate the principles and protections
most sacred to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. No less re-
pugnant is that the perpetrators of these depredations often go unpun-
ished. If contemporary international society is to be governed by the
rule of law, rather than by the savagery of men, those who perpetrate
these gross violations of human rights must be held personally account-
able for their unlawful acts. Article 8 of the Universal Declaration
mandates this action, and subsequent international instruments of
modern human rights law have codified the demand alleged offenders
22. See Progress Report on the Question of Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights
Violations, prepared by Mr. Guisse and Mr. Joinet, pursuant to Sub-Commission Resolu-
tion 1992/23, Sub-Commission on Prevention and Protection of all Minorities, 45th Sess.,
Item 10(a), (July 19, 1993) EICN.4/Sub.2/1993/6; Preliminary Report on Opposition to the
Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations (economic, social and cultural
rights), prepared by Mr. Guisse and Mr. Joinet, pursuant to Sub-Commission Resolution
1993/37, Sub-Commission on Prevention and Protection of all Minorities, 46th Sess., Item
10(a), (June 22, 1994) E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/ll; Progress Report on the Question of the Im-
punity of Perpetrators of Violations of Human Rights (civil and political rights), prepared
by Mr. Joinet, pursuant to Sub-Commission Resolution 1994/34, Subcommission on Pre-
vention and Protection of all Minorities, 47th Sess., Item 10, (June 28, 1995)
E/CN.4ISub.2/1995/18; Question of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Violations of Human
Rights (civil and political rights): Final Report prepared by Mr. Joinet, Pursuant to Sub-
Commission Resolution 1995/35, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, 48th Sess., Item 10, (June 29, 1996) UN Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/18, at 8; Joinet Principles, supra note 21. For analyses that call for
combating impunity, see generally IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND PRACTICE 14 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza ed., 1995); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Combating Impu-
nity: Some Thoughts on the Way Forward, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 93 (Autumn 1996)
[hereinafter Roht-Arriaza, Combating Impunity]; Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts:
The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537
(1991) [hereinafter Orentlicher, Settling Accounts].
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be prosecuted.
IV. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR ACCOUNTABILITY
The corpus of international law that has evolved since 1945 clearly
imposes obligations upon government parties to investigate and prose-
cute suspected violators of humanitarian law (i.e., the laws of war) and
other high human rights crimes (including genocide, torture, and crimes
against humanity). In this way, these international treaty instruments
establish a legal framework designed to combat impunity, as they pro-
hibit certain offenses that violate human rights norms and obligate ei-
ther the national or international prosecution of offenders.
A. The Nuremberg Precedent
International codification and consensus since the Second World
War have confirmed war crimes as international criminal acts, thus
permitting states to define and punish those extraterritorial crimes
wherever, and by whomever, they are committed. 23 Governments have
seen fit to allocate to the international community legal competence to
deal with crimes designated to have an international character, perpe-
trated by certain persons, during a specified time period, in a given ter-
ritory.
The legal competence to deal with high crimes involving human
rights violations evolved from the precedent set down by the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, 24 the Article VI provisions of its
Charter,25 and the Nuremberg Trials that followed in 1945. This legal
23. See Christopher C. Joyner, Enforcing Human Rights Standards in the Former
Yugoslavia: The Case for an International War Crimes Tribunal, 22 DENV. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 235 (1994) [hereinafter Joyner, Enforcing Human Rights].
24. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, Charter of the International Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, E.A.S.
No. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter Charter of the International Tribunal]. See also 13
DEP'T OF STATE BULL. at 222 (1945). For the relevance of the Nuremberg Court to the
International Tribunal for war crimes in Bosnia, see the discussion in Joyner, Enforcing
Human Rights, supra note 23, at 237-255.
25. Key among the Nuremberg Charter's central provisions was its Article VI, which
defined the jurisdiction of the court in these terms:
The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the jurisdiction
of the Tribunal for which there shall be individual responsibility:
(a) Crimes against the Peace: Namely, planning, preparation, initiation, or
waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties,
agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy
for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing;
(b) War crimes: Namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such viola-
1998
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legacy has been reaffirmed during the 1990s in the statutes of two spe-
cial international tribunals created by the United Nations Security
Council to prosecute and try alleged offenders for high crimes and hu-
man rights violations in the former Yugoslavia 26 and Rwanda. 27
Persons may be prosecuted under contemporary international law
for four groups of high human rights criminal offenses, namely: (1)
grave breaches of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949;28 (2) violations
of the laws or customs of war; (3) acts of genocide;29 and (4) crimes
against humanity.30 These acts have been stipulated by the interna-
tions shall include, but shall not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or de-
portation to slave labor or from any other purpose of civilian population of or
in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons
on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton
destruction of cities, town or villages, or devastation not justified by military
necessity;
(c) Crimes against Humanity: Namely, murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian popu-
lation before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or relig-
ious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the ju-
risdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of
the country where perpetrated.
Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formu-
lation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the fore-
going crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in
execution of such plan ....
Charter of the International Tribunal at Nuremberg, supra note 24, art. VI.
26. ICTY Statute, supra note 11.
27. ICTR Statute, supra note 12.
28. The Four Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949 are the: Convention for the Ame-
lioration of the Condition of the Wounded and the Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention No. 1]; Conven-
tion for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention No. II]; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention No. III]; Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 28 [hereinafter Geneva Convention No. IV] [hereinafter collectively Ge-
neva Conventions of 1949].
29. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 1 U.N. GAOR Res. 96 (Dec. 11, 1946) 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Con-
vention]. See also ICTY Statute, supra note 12, art. 4; ICTR Statute, supra note 12, art.
2.
30. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of
the European Axis (London Charter), signed at London, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82
U.N.T.S. 279, 3 Bevans 1238, entered into force Aug. 8, 1945; Control Council Law No. 10
(Punishment of Persons Guilty of War crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against Hu-
manity), adopted at Berlin, Dec. 20, 1945, Official Gazette of the Control Council for Ger-
many, No. 3, Berlin, Jan. 31, 1946, reprinted in BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, 1 AN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A STEP TOWARD WORLD PEACE 488 (1980) [hereinafter
REDRESSING IMPUNITY
tional community as criminal offenses against all humankind, from
which there ought to be no impunity. Perpetrators of these horrendous
acts must be prosecuted and held accountable for their crimes.
B. Grave Breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
Perhaps the clearest articulation of these offenses is found in the
four Geneva Conventions of 1949, in particular the common Article
(50/51/130/147) of those instruments.31  This provision defines the
"grave breaches" of international humanitarian law that states are re-
quired to punish. 32 Common Article 50/51/130/147 of the conventions
also prescribes minimum rules applicable to situations of armed conflict
FERENCZ]; International Military Tribunal for the Far East, proclaimed at Tokyo, Jan. 19,
1946 and amended Apr. 26, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589, 4 Bevans 20; Affirmation of the Prin-
ciples of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal (United
Nations General Assembly Resolution), adopted at New York, Dec. 11, 1946, U.N.G.A.
Res. 95(I), U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1 (1946); Principles of International Law Recognized in the
Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, adopted at Ge-
neva, July 29, 1950, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (no. 12), at 11, U.N. Doc. A11316(1950), 44
AM.J.INT'L L. 126 (1950); Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind: Ti-
tles and texts of articles on the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind adopted by the International Law Commission at its forty-eighth session (1996),
U.N. GAOR Int'l Law Comm., 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.532 (1996), July 15, 1996,
revised by U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.532/corr.1, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/L.532/corr.3; Convention on
the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Hu-
manity, opened for signature at New York, Nov. 26, 1968, G.A. Res. 2391, U.N. GAOR,
23d Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 40, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2391 (1968), 754 U.N.T.S. 73, 8 I.L.M. 68,
entered into force Nov. 1970; European Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory
Limitations to Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes (Inter-European), signed at
Strasbourg, Jan. 25, 1974, Europe. T.S. No. 82, 13 I.L.M. 540, not yet entered into force;
ICTY Statute, supra note 11, at art. 5; ICTR Statute, supra note 12, at art. 2.
31. As defined in the Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra note 28, certain "grave
breaches" are crimes committed against persons or property protected by the conventions
and include:
(i) Willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment of protected persons;
(ii) Willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health of
protected persons;
(iii) Taking of hostages and extensive destruction and appropriation of prop-
erty not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wan-
tonly;
(iv) Unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected
person;
(v) Compelling a prisoner of war or other protected person to serve in the
forces of a hostile power; and,
(vi) Willfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person of the
rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in the Geneva Conventions.
Id. common arts. 50/51/130/147, respectively.
32. Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra note 28, at common art. 3.
1998
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that are not international in character. Commission of a grave breach
warrants individual criminal liability, and governments party are
bound by the corresponding duty to prosecute accused offenders.33
Similarly, parties have the obligation to search for, prosecute, and pun-
ish perpetrators of grave breaches, unless they opt to turn such persons
over for trial to another state party. 34
Importantly, the duty to prosecute grave breaches under the Ge-
neva Conventions is limited to international conflicts. The interna-
tional conflict requirement derives from common article 2 of the four
Geneva Conventions. More recently, the Statute of the international
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia incorporated the essential language
of this common "grave breaches" provision into its Article 2, giving the
tribunal lawful authority to prosecute persons "committing or ordering
to be committed" certain acts that rise to the level of war crimes under
modern international humanitarian law. Thus, at present commission
of any of the following acts, without qualification, may be considered a
war crime:
(a) willful killing;
(b) torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments;
(c) willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or
health;
(d) extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justi-
fied by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;
(e) compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces of
a hostile power;
(f) willfully depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the rights of
fair and regular trial;
(g) unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a
civilian;
(h) taking civilians as hostages. 35
Since the violence in Rwanda was more of an ethnic rampage than
an internal war, the Statute for the Rwanda tribunal does not address
"grave breaches" per se. Rather it refers to "violations of Article 3 com-
mon to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II."36 In this
33. See VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 64-65 (1995).
34. Geneva Convention I, supra note 28, art. 51; Geneva Convention II, supra note
28, art. 52; Geneva Convention III, supra note 28, art. 131; Geneva Convention IV, supra
note 28, art. 148.
35. ICTY Statute, supra note 11, art. 2. Compare the language cited in common arti-
cles 50/51/130/147 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra note 28.
36. ICTR Statute, supra note 12, art. 4.
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regard, violations as enumerated in the Rwanda Statute "include, but
are not limited to," the following acts:
(a) Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of per-
sons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture,
mutilation or any form of corporal punishment.
(b) Collective punishments;
(c) Taking of hostages;
(d) Acts of terrorism;
(e) Outrages against personal dignity, in particular humiliating and
degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution, and any form of inde-
cent assault;
(f) Pillage;
(g) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions
without previous judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted
court, affording all the juridical guarantees which are recognized as in-
dispensable by civilized peoples;
(h) Threats to commits any of the foregoing acts. 37
As initially contained in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and subse-
quently upgraded in the two international tribunal statutes, accused
offenders of these grave breach prohibitions should be apprehended,
prosecuted and if convicted, duly punished. Put tersely, neither the Ge-
neva Convention nor the Statutes of the two current international
criminal tribunals contain provisions that approve of or guarantee im-
punity for offenders under special conditions or circumstances. Perpe-
trators are not to receive absolution for their high crimes, either from a
national court or under a special domestic law. The Geneva Conven-
tions and both the ICTY and ICTR Statutes are action instruments in-
tended to promote prosecution of alleged offenders, not absolve them of
individual responsibility or accountability.
C. Violations of the Laws or Customs of War
Another vital ingredient of international humanitarian law is the
1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land, especially the regulations annexed thereto. 38 The ICTY Stat-
ute upgrades and places into a more modern context these prohibitions,
with the assertion that persons should be prosecuted for violating the
laws or customs of war (as derived from the Hague Regulations), in-
37. Id.
38. Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oc-
tober 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277.
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cluding, but not restricted to the following:
(a) employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated
to cause unnecessary suffering;
(b) wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation
not justified by military necessity;
(c) attack, bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended towns,
villages, dwellings, or buildings;
(d) seizure of, destruction or willful damage done to institutions
dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, his-
toric monuments and works or art and science;
(e) plunder of public or private property. 39
These provisions originate from Articles 23-28 of the 1907 Hague
Regulations and they are generally regarded today as violations of the
laws of war under international humanitarian law. That is, certain war
crimes might be committed, which states are required to prosecute that
are neither "grave breaches" nor genocide, but nonetheless entail seri-
ous depredations of human rights.40 In particular, the Yugoslavia Tri-
bunal Statute explicitly underscores for the modern context the persis-
tent unlawfulness of acts articulated in the 1907 Hague Regulations
and 1949 Geneva. Conventions as grave breaches of international law. 41
These fiats are intended specifically to dissuade persons from commit-
ting such offensive acts. If however, persons do violate these norms,
states party are legally bound to punish those offenders. These regula-
tory mechanisms aim to punish, not pardon, perpetrators who violate
the normative customs of war. Offenders committing war crimes must
be held accountable for their unlawful acts; they are not to be excused
for purposefully violating the laws and customs of war.42
D. Genocide
The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Geno-
cide43 provides an absolute obligation to prosecute persons responsible
39. ICTY Statute, supra note 11, art. 3. See Hague Convention (IV) Annex (Regula-
tions), supra note 38, especially arts. 23, 25, 27, and 28.
40. See generally Diane F. Orentlicher, Responsibilities of States Participating in
Multilateral Operations with Respect to Persons Indicted for War Crimes, in REINING IN
IMPUNITY, supra note 8, at 193.
41. See generally Jordan J. Paust, Applicability of International Criminal Laws to
Events in the Former Yugoslavia, 9 AM. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 499, 511-12 (1994).
42. See generally Public International Law and Policy Group of the Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace, Bringing War Criminals to Justice: Obligations; Options;
Recommendations (Sept. 1997), reprinted in REINING IN IMPUNITY, supra note 8, at 549-
580.
43. See Genocide Convention, supra note 29. The crime of genocide is conceptually
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for committing acts of genocide. As defined in the Convention, genocide
is any of the following acts when committed "with the intent to destroy,
in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as
such":
(a) killing members of the group;
(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.44
These provisions, then, enumerate various acts that specifically
qualify as war crimes that are prosecutable as acts of genocide under
modern international law. Further, the Genocide Convention goes on to
stipulate that certain specific actions shall be punishable:
(a) genocide;
(b) conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) attempt to commit genocide;
(e) complicity to commit genocide.45
The Genocide Convention obligates that persons accused of commit-
ting genocide be tried by a "competent tribunal of the State in the terri-
tory of which the act was committed" or an acceptable international tri-
bunal and that parties punish convicted offenders through "effective
penalties."46  The convention does not, however, obligate parties to
prosecute all offenders in their custody, nor does it explicitly address
the prosecution of all such offenders irrespective of their location. Un-
der Article VI of the Genocide Convention, parties are obligated only to
exercise domestic jurisdiction pursuant to the territorial principle, with
offenders possibly being tried by a competent tribunal of the state
where the offense was committed, or by an international penal tribunal
derivative of the crimes against humanity prosecuted by the International Military Tri-
bunal at Nuremberg and the War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. The Gen-
eral Assembly resolution, adopted unanimously on December 11, 1946, affirmed the
"principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and
the Judgment of the Tribunal." G.A. Res. 96, 1 UN GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/64, at 188 (1946).
44. Id. art. II. Cf. ICTY Statute, supra note 11, art. 4, para. 2.; ICTR Statute, supra
note 12, art. 2, para. 2.
45. Genocide Convention, supra note 29, art. III. Cf. ICTY Statute, supra note 11,
art. 4, para. 3; ICTR Statute, supra note 12, art. 2, para. 3.
46. Genocide Convention, supra note 29, at arts. IV, V, and VI.
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that may have jurisdiction. 47
These qualifications notwithstanding, genocide remains a gross
crime under customary international law and gives rise to universal ju-
risdiction to the same degree as over war crimes and crimes against
humanity. 48 Indeed, genocide was treated as an offense against the law
of nations even before the Genocide Convention was drafted. The Gen-
eral Assembly adopted resolutions in 1946 affirming the Nuremberg
principles 49 and declaring genocide to be an international crime. 50 Every
state thus has the customary legal right to exercise universal jurisdic-
tion to prosecute offenders for committing genocide, wherever and by
whomever committed. The Genocide Convention does not derogate from
that obligation. Parties to the anti-genocide instrument have merely
obligated themselves to prosecute offenses committed solely within
their territory.
E. Crimes Against Humanity
There has emerged since World War II a customary obligation un-
der international law to prohibit and prosecute crimes against human-
ity.51 These most egregious of war crimes are committed systematically,
on a massive scale. Consequently, they cause acute revulsion and ne-
cessitate a direct international response. There clearly exists interna-
tional jurisdiction over cases that allege crimes against humanity, and
no statutory limitations are permissible.52
The criminalization of such acts originates in Article VI of the 1945
Nuremberg Charter. 53 Crimes against humanity are directed at any ci-
vilian population, and are prohibited in armed conflict, regardless of its
47. Id. art. 6.
48. See Christopher C. Joyner, Arresting Impunity: The Case for Universal Jurisdic-
tion in Bringing War Criminals to Accountability, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153 (1996);
Brigette Stern, Better Interpretation and Enforcement of Universal Jurisdiction, in
REINING IN IMPUNITY, supra note 8, at 175; Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction
Under International Law, 66 TEXAS L. REV. 785 (1988).
49. Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of
the Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95, 1 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/64iAdd. 1, at 188
(1946).
50. G.A. Res. 96, 1 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/64, at 188 (1946).
51. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW, 492, 500-01 (1992) [hereinafter BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY];
Carla Edelenbos, Human Rights Violations: A Duty to Prosecute?, LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 5, 15
(Autumn 1994): Orentlicher, Settling Accounts, supra note 22, at 2585, 2593.
52. This is provided for in the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limi-
tations to War crimes and Crimes against Humanity, entered into force Nov. 11, 1970,
754 U.N.T.S. 73, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 68 (1969). See generally BASSIOUNI, CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 51.
53. See Charter of the International Tribunal, supra note 25, art. VI para. (c).
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international or internal character. The ICTY Statute stipulates these
critical points in the modern context and enumerates eight categories of
specific acts to be regarded as crimes against humanity: (1) murder; (2)
extermination; (3) enslavement; (4) deportation; (5) imprisonment; (6)
torture; (7) rape; and (8) persecution on political, racial and religious
grounds. A ninth category, "other inhumane acts," was included to
make the list potentially all-inclusive. 54 A significant realization is that
the Statute pertaining to war crimes in the former Yugoslavia improves
on Article VI of the 1945 Nuremberg Charter by specifically designating
two new acts as crimes against humanity: torture and rape.
The condemnation of acts of torture finds explicit expression in the
1984 Convention Against Torture, 55 which is now in force with 105 par-
ties 56 and is accepted as a peremptory norm in human rights law.57 As
defined in the Convention, "torture" means:
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental,
is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining
from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him
for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any
reason based on discrimination or any kind, when such pain or suffer-
ing is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquies-
cence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It
does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or inci-
dental to lawful sanctions. 58
There is no question that many of the most brutal atrocities committed
against victims of human rights abuse include acts of torture under this
definition, which has been elaborated on by other international instru-
ments prohibiting torture.59
54. ICTY Statute, supra note 11, art. 5.
55. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, entered into force June 28, 1987, G.A. Res. 39/46,
39 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 51) at 197 (1984).
56. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 December
1984 (visited Apr. 29, 1998)
<http:/www.un.orglDepts/Treaty/finallts2/newfiles/part-boo/ivboo/iv_9.html> [hereinaf-
ter Torture Convention].
57. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw CONVENTIONS AND THEIR
PENAL PROVISIONS 489-99 (1997). See also M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes:
Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57 (1996), reprinted
in REINING IN IMPUNITY, supra note 8, at 133.
58. Torture Convention, supra note 56, art. 1.
59. See Treaty on European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Inter-European), opened for signature at Stras-
bourg, Nov. 26, 1987, Europe. T.S. No. 126, 27 I.L.M. 1152, entered into force Feb. 1, 1989;
Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, done at Cartagena de Indias,
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The Torture Convention obligates each state party to ensure that
all acts of torture are made criminal offenses under its domestic law60
and to establish its jurisdiction over the offense when, inter alia, the
alleged perpetrator or victim is a national of that state. 61 Moreover, if a
state does not extradite an alleged offender, that government is re-
quired to "submit the case to its competent authorities" for prosecu-
tion.62 In addition, the Convention prohibits any "exceptional circum-
stances," including conditions or threats of war, internal political
stability, or public emergencies from being used by a government to jus-
tify torture.63 Nor may an order from a superior officer or public
authority be used to justify acts of torture. 64
The Torture Convention suffers from certain weaknesses in its ap-
plication, however, especially when contrasted with the Genocide Con-
vention. The Genocide Convention explicitly asserts forthright duties
mandating that offenders "shall be punished,"65 and persons accused of
committing genocide "shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State
in the territory of which the act was committed" or an acceptable inter-
national tribunal. 66 Moreover, the state is required to "provide effective
penalties" for persons found guilty of genocide. 67 In contrast, the Tor-
ture Convention requires parties only to "submit" cases of alleged tor-
ture to their "competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution," and
makes acts of torture punishable simply by "appropriate penalties
which taken into account their grave nature."68 Regrettably, the anti-
torture instrument fails explicitly to mandate that prosecution must oc-
cur for all alleged cases of torture, or to stipulate that, without excep-
tion, severe penalties will be handed down for persons found guilty of a
torture offense. 69
The crime of rape, the criminality of which largely has been over-
looked in past wars, assumed great urgency with the reported massive
sexual assaults against women in Bosnia and Herzegovina during 1992
Dec. 9, 1985, AG/Res. 783 (XV-0/85), O.A.S. General Assembly, 15th Sess. IEA/Ser.P.
AGIDoc. 22023/85 rev. 1 at 46-54 (1986), O.A.S. Treaty Series, No. 67, 25 I.L.M. 519, en-
tered into force Feb. 28, 1987.
60. Torture Convention, supra note 56, art. 4, para. 1.
61. Id. art. 5, para. 1.
62. Id. art. 7, para. 4.
63. Id. art. 2, para. 2.
64. Id. art. 2, para. 3.
65. Id. art. IV.
66. Id. art. VI.
67. Id. art. V.
68. Id. art. 7, para. 1; art. 4, para. 2.
69. See Orentlicher, Settling Accounts, supra note 22, at 2604.
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and 1993.70 By designating rape as a specific crime against humanity,
the gross criminality of that act has been spotlighted as a grave viola-
tion of human rights - indeed, a war crime under international law -
and international concern has been directly focused on the need to
punish perpetrators. Important to note, however, is that crimes against
humanity have not been legally codified into a special ad hoc convention
for the purpose of explicitly outlining and detailing the criminal nature
of acts of genocide and the specific obligations of states in confronting
perpetrators. 71
V. THE DUTY OF ACCOUNTABILITY
Fundamental to the punishment of high human rights crimes is the
principle of individual criminal responsibility. For contemporary inter-
national law, a person who plans, instigates, orders, commits or other-
wise aids and abets in the planning, preparation or execution of these
acts shall be held individually responsible for the crime. 72 International
criminal law today thus confronts the principle that individuals may be
held criminally liable under international law, even though their con-
duct might have been sanctioned or even mandated by domestic law.
To enforce the laws of war and prohibitions against genocide and
crimes against humanity only against ordinary soldiers and officers of
low or mid-level rank is not enough. Although "superior orders" is in-
sufficient as a defense against a charge of violating high human rights
crimes, justice still demands that culpability apply throughout the
chain of command. Accountability under international law must, thus,
reach military elite and civilian government officials, as well as indi-
vidual civilians and paramilitary forces who commit the acts. Indeed, as
set by the Nuremberg precedent and resurrected for modern humani-
tarian law, the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR both assert:
2. The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of
70. See the discussion in Final Report of the Commission of Experts, supra note 10, at
55-60. In late 1992 and -early 1993, the European Community sent a special mission
headed Dame Ann Warburton to investigate the treatment of Muslim women in the for-
mer Yugoslavia. This mission found that the number of women raped might range from
10,000-60,000, and that rape was used by the Serbs as a premeditated strategy to terror-
ize Muslim populations and to force them to leave their homes. See European Community
investigative mission into the treatment of Muslim women in the former Yugoslavia: Re-
port to European Community Foreign Ministers, U.N. Doc. S/25240 (3 Feb. 1993), Annex I,
at 2; M. Cherif Bassiouni & Marcia McCormick, Sexual Violence: An Invisible Weapon of
War in the Former Yugoslavia, Occasional Paper #1, (DePaul Int'l Hum. Rts. L. Inst.
1996).
71. For the logic demanding such a convention, see M. Cherif Bassiouni, "Crimes
Against Humanity:" The Need for a Specialized Convention, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
457-94 (1994).
72. ICTY Statute, supra note 11, art. 7, para. 1.
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State or Government or as a responsible Government official, shall not
relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.
3. The fact that any of the [criminal] acts.., of the present Stat-
ute was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of
criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the sub-
ordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior
failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such
acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.73
It is clear, then, that due obedience can not exonerate a perpetrator
from criminal responsibility. The soldier who pulls the trigger; the
commander who gives the order, or knows the crime is going to be
committed and does not use his authority to stop it from occurring; the
civilian decision-maker who makes the policy generating the criminal
act - all these persons are liable for criminal accountability for that of-
fense.
The Tribunals
Member states of the United Nations are obligated to give various
forms of assistance - including but not limited to arrest, detention and
surrender of accused offenders - to international tribunals created by
the Security Council. This obligation derives from Chapter VII of the
Charter, which allocates to the Security Council broad responsibility
"with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of
aggression," with the specific authority to "decide what measures shall
be taken ... to maintain or restore international peace and security."74
The obligation to carry out these measures is explicitly stated in
the UN Charter, which provides that "The action required to carry out
decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international
peace and security shall be taken by all Members of the United Na-
tions."75
The obligation on states to surrender alleged offenders to these ad
hoc international criminal tribunals is articulated in paragraph 4 of UN
Security Council Resolution 827 (Yugoslavia) and paragraph 2 of Reso-
lution 955 (Rwanda), both of which provide that:
[The Security Council] Decides that all States shall cooperate fully
with the International Tribunal and its organs in accordance with the
present resolution and the Statute of the International Tribunal and
that consequently all States shall take any measures necessary under
73. ICTY Statute, supra note 11, art. 7, paras. 2 & 3; ICTR Statute, supra note 12,
art. 6, paras. 2 & 3.
74. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
75. U.N. CHARTER art. 48, para 1.
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their domestic laws to implement the provisions of the present resolu-
tion and the Statute, including the obligation of States to comply with
requests for assistance or orders issued by a Trial Chamber under Arti-
cle 29 [for Rwanda, Article 281 of the Statute .... 76
Thus, all persons who participate in the planning, preparation or
execution of serious violations of international humanitarian law share
in the commission of the crime and are therefore individually responsi-
ble. Both tribunals also hold that principal responsibility for war crimes
pursuant to orders falls to those in authority who gave the orders.
There are no provisions for pardons, amnesties, or impunity laws. Al-
leged offenders are to be tried for their high crimes, not excused on ac-
count of their political power or military rank. The final word on impu-
nity is this: High crimes that violate human rights are evil, vile and
unlawful. Such gross delicts must be not be allowed to escape punish-
ment. There can be no peace without justice, and there can be no justice
without accountability.
Accepting these principles, certain weaknesses of international tri-
bunals have been revealed by the experience of the ICTY and the ICTR
since 1993. Both tribunals have been impotent to enforce arrest war-
rants and subpoenas. Exercising such means of apprehension remains
in the hands of occupant military forces or local security police. Further,
the tribunals' viability and success depend on continuing political and
support from the United Nations, particularly the Great Powers on the
Security Council. Such dependency obviously invites political considera-
tions to creep in and impair the prospects for effective tribunal opera-
tions. Arrest of indictees ultimately depends on the genuine cooperation
of the government in whose territory indicted persons are located,
which this has been difficult to secure. Failure to apprehend the indict-
ees further undercuts the credibility and effectiveness of both tribunals.
Have these international tribunals served justice and contributed
to national reconciliation within the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda?
Yes, but with certain qualifications. Again, these courts have been seri-
ously hamstrung by insufficient funding, inadequate financial and
military support, and only very limited opportunities to demonstrate
76. In relevant part, Article 29 of the Yugoslavia Tribunal Statute and Article 28 of
the Rwanda Tribunal Statute assert that:
1. States shall cooperate with the International Tribunal in the investigation
and prosecution of persons accused of committing serious violations of inter-
national humanitarian law.
2. State shall comply without undue delay with any request for assistance or
an order issued by a Trials Chamber, including, but not limited to:
(d) the arrest or detention of persons;
(e) the surrender or the transfer of the accused to the International Tribunal.
ICTY Statute, supra note 11, art. 29; ICTR Statute, supra note 12, art. 28.
1998
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
their worthiness.
Truth Commissions
Truth commissions can be successful in fostering peace and na-
tional conciliation. 77 Such commissions establish a historical record of
the crimes and context in which they were committed.78 Truth commis-
sions contribute to a sense of closure. For example, the South African
Truth Commission is generally regarded as a successful instrument of
national reconciliation. Its purpose was to rescue South Africa from de-
nial and lies about its past, bestow dignity on those who had suffered,
and extend a magnanimous offer of forgiveness to the perpetrators of
horrible crimes. It granted amnesty to persons who disclosed fully their
crimes during the period of apartheid, but only if their crime was not
disproportionate to its political aim. When combined with prosecutions,
the South African experience since 1995 proffered a unique model that
worked successfully due to the right chemistry of conditions-peace,
genuine political will and functioning local judicial system. 79 But other
facts also remain: Truth commissions do not produce full justice. They
are not intended to. Nor will a truth commission reveal the whole truth.
But, then again, it could not have been expected to. Reconciliation will
stay incomplete, and so, too, will the hope for justice. Forgiveness, not
justice, is the price deemed necessary if a truth commission is to help
heal a society of the pain and suffering brought about by internal war
and violent ethnic strife. And this poses the crux of the dilemma:
Should those who perpetrate the most terrible of crimes escape pun-
ishment, at the price only of admitting their guilt and showing remorse?
For the experience chosen by South Africa, the price of peace and recon-
ciliation is "the truth" with amnesty. It is neither justice nor compensa-
tion. How well forgiveness actually works as a strategy for fostering
political stability will only be seen in coming years.
Ways and Means of Impunity
There is no question that contemporary international law man-
77. For a positive view of the role of truth commissions, see Michael P. Scharf, The
Case for a Permanent International Truth Commission, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 375
(1997).
78. See Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions - 1974 to 1994: A Compara-
tive Study, 16 HUM. RTS Q. 1 (1994); Stephan Landsman, Alternative Responses to Serious
Human Rights Abuses: Of Prosecution and Truth Commissions, 59 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 81 (1996); Jo M. Pasqualucci, The Whole Truth and Nothing But the Truth: Truth
Commissions, Impunity, and the Inter-American Human Rights System, 12 BOSTON U.
INT'L L.J. 321 (1994).
79. Burying South Africa's Past: Of Memory and Forgiveness, THE ECONOMIST 21-23
(Nov. 1, 1997).
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dates that persons who gravely violate human rights enshrined in the
Universal Declaration must pay consequences. Indeed, the normative
framework of modern international law clearly asserts that perpetra-
tors of high human rights crimes should be prosecuted, and if convicted,
punished accordingly. But this all too rarely occurs; the evil of impunity
persists. The reasons for impunity are often couched in the nature of a
country's government and its people's failure to produce a civil society
based on the rule of law.
Impunity takes on factual and normative dimensions. The factual
aspects of impunity refer to the particular circumstances and internal
political-social conditions that permit gross human rights violators to
evade prosecution in some state. The fact is that impunity can be and
often is facilitated by the government.
Gross violations of human rights are often, but not always perpe-
trated by state security forces, be they military or police agents. Such
depredations can be perpetrated also by unattached militias, paramili-
tary death squads and remnants of insurgent movements. In societies
torn apart by ethnic hatreds and civil conflict, an extraordinary high
potential for violence exists. In these situations, the possibility for im-
punity becomes an ever-present likelihood.
Conditions that tolerate impunity are personal; they center on the
victim and demonstrate the intimate, powerless side of victimization.
Such conditions personify being next to an abuser and feeling helpless
at ever being able to obtain justice for the wrongs being perpetrated.
Perhaps even more disheartening for victim survivors is watching as
former perpetrators are subsequently elevated to positions of authority
in the government-a situation that not only permits them to escape
prosecution and punishment, but also enables them to exert even more
power and control over their former victims.
In societies where a turn toward democracy has actually been
made, impunity can become more a problem of looking backward to cor-
rect the past - a dilemma of trying to come to terms with past wrongs
done to victims and of juridically evaluating crimes committed by mem-
bers of the former government, or of their surrogates.
1. Military Justice Systems
The principal normative dimensions of impunity are often tied to
the presence of a military justice system and various national impunity
laws. Military justice systems, well known in Latin American states,
have generated impunity for fellow officers who were alleged to have
committed violations in the name of state security.8 0 There appears to
80. See generally Kai Ambos, Impunity and International Criminal Law, 18 HUM.
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be a logical link between impunity and military justice, which renders
the latter even more of an oxymoron. Military proceedings, especially in
Latin American states, have often been used to facilitate impunity sanc-
tioned by the state and only rarely bring to trial and prosecution mili-
tary officers accused of serious human rights deprivations.8 1 By the
same token, pervasive efforts by the military to intimidate civil gov-
ernment officials and make direct threats against the judicial branch
and witnesses stand out as real actions intended to produce impunity in
fact, if not in law.
Direct links clearly exist between military justice and impunity.
Military legislation is often crucial for granting impunity to perpetra-
tors, since in many national circumstances, military tribunals hold ex-
tensive jurisdiction over human rights conditions in the country. Mili-
tary courts are composed of military officers, many who may be
sympathetic to accused offenders and may render judgments based on
personal loyalties rather than evidence or considerations of justice.8 2
2. National Impunity Laws
The normative dimension also pertains to domestic legal considera-
tions. Certain states have passed laws that are intended to grant impu-
nity. These laws include provisions for amnesty or pardon for certain
human rights violations, and exempt offenders from punishment or im-
pede effective criminal prosecutions against them. An amnesty gener-
ally leads to the extinction or erasure of criminal prosecution and exe-
cution of a sentence; a pardon extinguishes only the execution of a
sentence. These are direct, immediate forms of impunity, as they for-
mally and factually exempt human rights violators from what most per-
sons would consider just punishment.8 3
Impunity laws are obviously unique to each national situation and
circumstance. Even so, such laws may well violate the principle of
equality and the need for legal remedies to redress criminal acts. From
a policy perspective, there also arises the question of to what extent the
armed forces of a state are willing to accept international legal stan-
RTS L.J. 1 (1997) [hereinafter Ambos].
81. Id. 4-5.
82. See id. at 4, 8-9.
83. Examples of such impunity laws include Ley 104 of Dec. 30, 1993, Regimen Penal
Colombiano envio 36 (februro/abril de 1994) and envio 38 (noviembre de 1994), sections
8122 ff (Colombia); DL [Decree Law] 2.191 of Apr. 18, 1978, Dario Oficial No. 30.042
(Apr. 19, 1978) (Chile); DL 22.924 of Sept. 22, 1983, Legislacion Argentina (1983-B), at
1681 (Argentina). But see Ley 23.040 of Dec. 22, 1983, Legislacion Argentina (1983-B), at
1813; and Ley 26.479 of June 14, 1995, Normas Legales 229 (June 1995), at 143 (Peru).
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dards and the requisite reforms of military law. These are vital consid-
erations if impunity through miscarriages of military "justice" is to be
averted.
The duty to prosecute certain grave human rights violations, de-
rived from international criminal law, clearly implies that criminal acts
subject to such a duty cannot at least in principle be amnestied. While
an international norm affirming the permissibility of amnesties in cer-
tain situations does exist,8 4 it does not apply to human rights viola-
tions.85 Indeed, the practice of granting self amnesties violate the pro-
hibition against privileging a particular group of people, as well as the
principle of equality.8 6 Such self-serving amnesties usually lack legiti-
macy, in that they violate the prohibition against acting in one's own
self-interest. Further, amnesties are prohibited when a state of emer-
gency is declared. Certain human rights are nonderogable, even under a
state of emergency, and must be protected under national penal law.
8 7
The question critical here is: Do amnesties actually contribute to
the restoration of peace, national unity and reconciliation as often
claimed by official policy? Or, do they generate new frictions and ten-
sions within society-and thus exacerbate the potential for prolonged
civil conflict-by disregarding the feelings and dignity of victims and
their families? No blanket statement can be made that uniformly an-
swers this conundrum. Obviously, understanding the political context
within which such acts of amnesty might be taken could shed light on a
state legislature's motive in granting amnesty, or even expose the true
84. Not all amnesties are contrary to human rights law. See article 6(5) of Protocol
Additional II to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protec-
tion of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609,
614 (calling for the "broadest possible amnesty" following non-international armed con-
flicts). Amnesties are also expressly foreseen in article 6(4) of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16
at 52, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 302 entered into force Mar. 23, 1976 [herein-
after ICCPR]. The ICCPR has 27 substantive articles addressing various aspects of politi-
cal and civil rights.
85. See generally Roht-Arriaza, Combating Impunity, supra note 22; Orentlicher, Set-
tling Accounts, supra note 22; Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and
Prosecute Grave Human Rights Violations in International Law, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 449-
513 (1990); Douglas Cassel, Lessons from the Americas: Guidelines for International Re-
sponse to Amnesties for Atrocities, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197 (1996) [hereinafter
Cassel].
86. The United Nations Human Rights Committee reaffirmed this fundamental prin-
ciple in 1992. See UNHRC, General Comment No. 20 regarding Art. 7 of the Covenant of
Civil and Political Rights, para. 15, UN Doc. CCPRJC/21IRev. 1/Add. 3 (Apr. 7, 1992).
87. See generally Michael P. Scharf, Swapping Amnesty for Peace: Was There a Duty
to Prosecute International Crimes in Haiti?, 31 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1 (1996); Robert 0. Weiner,
Trying to Make Ends Meet: Reconciling the Law and Practice of Human Rights Amnesties,
26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 857, 867 (1995).
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political motivations behind a certain amnesty decision.88
From a criminal law perspective, recognition of an exemption from
mitigation or punishment depends on the personal blameworthiness of
the perpetrator. If the offender is unaware of the legal wrong, punish-
ment depends on the extent to which that wrong was avoidable. A
wrongful act is presumed to be avoidable if the order was manifestly
illegal. Otherwise, the wrongful act could be deemed unavoidable, and
the subordinate would not deserve punishment.
A directive that grants a pardon is permissible only if it takes effect
after a significant portion of the sentence has been served.8 9 Other pro-
visions that might impede criminal prosecution, in particular national
statutes of limitation, violate international law if they apply to crimes
against humanity. No statute of limitation exists on such egregious
violations of human rights. Nor do statutes of limitation apply to cases
of disappearance - explicitly so at least in the Organization of Ameri-
can States system.9 0 The admissibility of statutes of limitation in cases
of torture and extralegal executions turns on how these crimes are clas-
sified. In any event, their prosecution as crimes against humanity can-
not be barred by statute.9 1
VI. THE BALANCE SHEET
In the aftermath of internal war or ethnic conflict, there is the criti-
cal need to foster national reconciliation, deal with war criminals and
rebuild foundations for a society governed by the rule of law. As regards
Article 8 of the Universal Declaration, there is the underlying question
of how to come to terms with serious violations of human rights and
achieve lasting reconciliation. A variety of accountability mechanisms
are available-national apology by head of state, reparations for vic-
tims, truth commissions, prosecution by international or national tri-
bunals.92
Recognition of the international legal order, especially as regards
human rights obligations, implies the need for strict compliance by gov-
ernments of that law. As a dynamic legal order, international criminal
law requires the constant adaptation of national laws so as to ensure
their compatibility with the protection of fundamental human rights.
88. See generally Jose Zalaquett, Confronting Human Rights Violations Committed by
Former Governments: Principles Applicable and Political Constraints, in STATE CRIMES:
PUNISHMENT OR PARDON? 23-65 (Aspen Institute, 1989) [hereinafter STATE CRIMES:
PUNISHMENT OR PARDON?]; Cassel, supra note 85.
89. Ambos, supra note 80, at 7.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See generally Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 15-20.
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Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights plainly as-
serts that victims of gross human rights abuse are entitled to redress.
Individuals responsible for those heinous crimes must be held account-
able, especially for war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.
Absent a sense of justice for citizens who have suffered under ruthlessly
abusive regimes or who have been divided by ethnic or civil war, the
prospects for enduring peace and national reconciliation seem severely
diminished. 93
For the most part, internal conflict (i.e., civil war) and ruthless vic-
timization of persons by their government lie beyond international law's
regulation of armed conflicts. That admitted, human rights law has
nonetheless evolved to prohibit war crimes, crimes against humanity,
genocide, and torture by any government against its own citizens or
other people in that state, regardless of the legal context of the con-
flict.94
Even so, significant weaknesses persist in state practice with re-
spect to the performance of these normative prescriptions. Especially
notable is the failure by governments to extradite or prosecute and to
cooperate in the investigation, prosecution and adjudication of persons
charged with genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity and
the punishment of those convicted of such crimes.95 While the duty to
prosecute or extradite is contained in the Genocide Convention and the
Geneva Conventions of 1949,96 it does not exist in international treaty
law for crimes against humanity, simply because there is no special
convention on those crimes.
Under international criminal law, no exemption from punishment
is permitted for so-called international crimes, especially war crimes,
genocide and crimes against humanity.97 The responsibility of the supe-
rior follows from the doctrine of command responsibility, which has
been universally recognized under customary international law. 98
93. See Yael Danieli, Justice and Reparation: Steps in the Process of Healing, in
REINING IN IMPUNITY, supra note 8, at 303.
94. See Peter Baehr, How to Deal with the Past, in REINING IN IMPUNITY, supra note
8, at 415.
95. See generally Michael Scharf, The Letter of the Law: The Scope of the Interna-
tional Legal Obligation to Prosecute Human Rights Crimes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
41 (1996)
96. See Genocide Convention, supra note 29, art. VII; Geneva Conventions of 1949,
supra note 28, arts. 49/50/129/146, respectively.
97. See generally STATE CRIMES: PUNISHMENT OR PARDON?, supra note 88.
98. See generally Note, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 82 YALE L. J. 1274
(1973); Hays Parks, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 MILITARY L. REV. 1
(1973); Weston D. Burnett, Command Responsibility and a Case Study of the Criminal
Responsibility of Israeli Military Commanders for the Pogrom at Shatila and Sabra, 107
MILITARY L. REV. 71 (1985); Paul Williams & Norman Cigar, THE BALKAN INST., WAR
CRIMES AND INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY: A PRIMA FACE CASE FOR THE INDICTMENT OF
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Within the context of international criminal law, however, the legal di-
lemma persists as to whether the superior's conduct qualifies as perpe-
tration or as complicity, which in turn depends on assessment of the
superior's conduct. Often it may be difficult, if not impossible, to deter-
mine with precision the nature and degree of the superior's control over
the subordinate.
The extensive use of military justice in cases of human rights viola-
tions has tended to contravene obligations derived from international
criminal law, in that most of these proceedings have led to a factual ex-
emption from punishment for perpetrators of serious human rights
violations. Similar is the situation of unrestricted resort to defense of
superior orders, which implies impunity for any act committed in execu-
tion of a superior's order. International criminal law has clearly and
unmistakably established that orders leading to the commission of
grave human rights violations are illegal and therefore cannot justify
exemptions from punishment. In certain exceptional cases, though,
punishment of a subordinate might be lessened if he/she had acted un-
der mitigating circumstances, i.e., under coercion or duress.99
The causes of impunity are more factual than normative. Power
and influence of security forces, particularly the armed forces, are real
conditions in many societies. That these institutions possess certain
privileges that ultimately produce impunity is explained by the facts
and circumstances of situations, rather than the normative instruction
or legal mandate of international criminal law. Thus, impunity derives
not as a right or norm sanctioned by society, but rather more so as the
result of the distribution of political and social power in that society.
Control of that power determines the likelihood of impunity. If the dis-
tribution of power in a state changes, the normative character of and
prospects for impunity also will change. 100
It is not, therefore, the law that so greatly shapes power relations
affecting objective considerations of justice; rather, it is the political
power in the state that determines the interpretation and application of
that law, which in turn approves policies of impunity. Hence, the re-
sponsibility for authorizing impunity rests with the individuals who
shape, conceptualize, interpret and apply the law. It is they-the gov-
erning policy makers-who determine and are accountable for the legal
disposition of human rights violations and effecting redress for vic-
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC (1995).
99. See the Joinet Principles, supra note 21, principle 29, para. 35 [sic], at 506 (at
most due obedience may be taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstance).
100. Cf. the views of F.M. Lorenz, Combating Impunity: Practical Limits on the Use of
Military Force, in REINING IN IMPUNITY, supra note 8, at 465.
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As Article 8 of the Universal Declaration affirms, means of redress
must be afforded victims of gross violations of human rights. 102 To this
end, participation of the victim in the criminal proceedings against a
perpetrator can make impunity less likely. A truly fair-trial procedure
must grant a victim adequate judicial remedies. The role of the victim
depends on the national procedural code, and a sympathetic code should
permit the active participation of the victim or his/her family in the
case.103
While adequate respect for the interests of the victim during a
criminal trial is necessary, it is not sufficient. Extra-penal means of
compensation and reconciliation should be considered. The attempt
should be made to restore the status quo ante situation of the victims,
i.e., to seek a natural restitution of the victim in society. Restoration
might include compensatory payments, the right of return, and reha-
bilitation. 104
For genuine social reconciliation and peacemaking, serious efforts
must be made to mitigate the pain and emotional suffering of victims
and their families by taking measures that address the psychological
aspects of human rights violations and the inability to return to the
human situation before the violations were perpetrated. Symbolic and
public forms of compensation, such as national truth and reconciliation
commissions, can provide opportunities for such emotional catharsis,
and these should be undertaken when and wherever deemed appropri-
ate. They might assist in clarifying past human rights violations and
bringing the society closer to reconciliation. As a minimum political
101. See generally Theo van Boven, Accountability for International Crimes: The Vic-
tim's Perspective, in REINING IN IMPUNITY, supra note 8, at 349 [hereinafter van Boven];
Madeline H. Morris, International Guidelines Against Impunity: Facilitating Accountabil-
ity, in id. at 359; Dinah PoKempner, A Few Thoughts on Standards, Practice, and Mecha-
nisms, in id. at 373.
102. See Study concerning the Right to Restitution, Compensation, and Rehabilitation
for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: Final Re-
port Submitted by Mr. Theo van Boven, Special Rapporteur, Commission on Human
Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,
45th sess., Item 4, UN Doc. E/CN.4/SUB.2/1993/8 (July 2, 1993), reprinted as Appendix C
in 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 283 (1996) [hereinafter the van Boven Principles]. See
also Question of the Human Rights of all Persons Subjected to any Form of Detention or
Imprisonment: Note by the Secretary-General, E1CN.4119971104 (Jan. 16, 1997): Annex:
Note prepared by the former Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission, Mr. Theo van
Boven, in accordance with paragraph 2 of the Subcommission resolution 1996/28 (Jan. 13,
1997), Appendix: Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right of Reparation for Victims of
[Gross] Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, (visited Apr. 6,
1998) <http:llwww.unhchr.chhtml/menu4chrrepll0497.htm>.
103. van Boven, supra note 101, at 352.
104. See van Boven Principles, supra note 102, at 344.
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goal, such truth commissions can create conditions that recognize the
past suffering of victims and the perpetrators' criminal wrongdoing.'l 5
But this purging of the truth cannot be a substitute for punishment of
the perpetrators. The search for truth remains a basic prerequisite for
civil society, but it cannot be treated as a panacea to excuse war crimes
and acts of genocide that offend the conscience of humanity.10 6
Upholding certain rights is critical if impunity is to be denied for
violators of human rights. First, fundamental in this regard is the vic-
tim's right to know. This includes the right to learn the truth about
events and circumstances surrounding gross violations, as well the
causes giving rise to specific violations of human rights.10 7 Second,
closely tied to this is the state's (i.e., the government's) duty to remem-
ber the history of oppression. Presumably this is to guard against repe-
tition of similar unlawful acts in the future.108 Third, no less critical are
the victims' right to know the truth about the fate of relatives and loved
ones,10 9 and the victim's fundamental right to justice.110 No just and
lasting reconciliation is possible without an effective response to the
need for justice. If reconciliation is really to happen, an essential pre-
requisite is forgiveness.1 ' This involves a private act by the victim that
assumes the perpetrators are known and that they are genuinely repen-
tant and remorseful.
Impunity also involves the failure of governments to meet certain
obligations under international law. If Article 8 of the Universal Decla-
ration is to satisfied, governments must undertake to investigate al-
leged violations, take appropriate measures toward the perpetrators,
and ensure that the latter are prosecuted and tried, and provide victims
with effective remedies. 112 Toward this end, national courts are given
priority jurisdiction, though international tribunals may be used when
national courts are unable to respond satisfactorily to the requirements
of justice. 113
Universal jurisdiction applicable to serious crimes under interna-
tional and humanitarian law should be included in all human rights in-
struments dealing with such crimes. 114
105. See generally Juan Mndez, Accountability for Past Abuses, 19 HUM. RTS Q. 255
(1997).
106. See Juan Mndez, The Right to Truth, in REINING IN IMPUNITY, supra note 8, at
255; Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Truth Commissions as Part of a Social Process, in id. at 279.
107. See Joinet Principles, supra note 21, principles 1-17.
108. Id. principle 2.
109. Id. principle 3.
110. Id. principles 18-32.
111. See Joinet Principles, supra note 21, para. 26, at 505.
112. Id. principle 18.
113. Id. principle 19.
114. Id. principle 21.
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States should take measures in their national law to establish ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction over high crimes under international law
which have been committed outside their territory, irrespective of the
nationality of the victim or the perpetrator."15
More restrictive measures should be imposed in circumstances
where governments might grant impunity. Legal opportunities that
should be restricted would include:
1. Prescription. The assertion by a government of an authoritative
directive or order granting impunity should not be applicable to high
crimes involving human rights violations, since those violations entail
such grave offenses to human dignity. 116
2. Amnesty. Perpetrators of gross and systematic violations of hu-
man rights should not be included in amnesties so long as the victims
are not able to avail themselves of fair and effective remedies for those
violations."17
3. The right of asylum. States may not lawfully extend the protec-
tive status of asylum to persons who are suspected of having committed
high crimes that violate fundamental human rights under international
law.118
4. Extradition. Persons who have perpetrated high crimes that se-
riously violate human rights may not lawfully seek to be excluded from
extradition on grounds of the political offense exception and the non-
extradition of nationals, save in cases where they might be subject to
the death penalty." 19
5. Defense of superior orders. Persons who commit high crimes on
the order of his government or a superior can not be exempt from
criminal responsibility for those violations of human rights. Similarly,
the fact that violations are perpetrated by a subordinate does not ex-
cuse his superiors from responsibility if they knew ordered the viola-
tions, or knew of the violations and failed to take action to prevent or
halt the violations form occurring. 120
6. Jurisdiction of military courts. In order to preclude military
courts from perpetuating impunity for. human rights violations perpe-
trated against civilians, military courts must be limited only to trying
offenses committed among military personnel.' 2'
115. Id. principle 22.
116. Id. principle 24.
117. Id. principle 25.
118. Id. principle 26.
119. Id. principle 27.
120. Id. principle 29.
121. Id. principle 31.
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There are also certain basic principles concerning the right to repa-
ration for victims of high crimes involving human rights violations. 122
Accepting the premise presumed in the Universal Declaration that
every state has the fundamental obligation to ensure respect for human
rights under international humanitarian law, certain duties flow from
that obligation, among them the duties to prevent violations, to investi-
gate violations, to take action against violators, and to afford remedies
and reparations to victims.123 Given this, certain norms must be applied
to ensue respect for international humanitarian law, especially the
right to a remedy. 124 Every state should provide for universal jurisdic-
tion over gross violations of human rights, which constitute high crimes
under international law.125 Moreover, reparations should be available
for claim directly by the victims of high violations of human rights,
their immediate family, or persons associated closely with the vic-
tims.126
States have the duty to adopt measures that implement expeditious
and fully effective reparations. The purposes of reparations are to ren-
der justice by redressing the consequences of wrongful acts and by pre-
venting or deterring such acts in the future. Forms of reparation should
include restitution, which means restoring the situation for a victim
that existed prior to violations of human rights or international hu-
manitarian law. 127 In addition, there must be compensation for eco-
nomically assessable damage resulting from human rights violations,
especially for physical or mental harm, lost opportunities, material
damages and loss of earnings, "harm to reputation or dignity," and costs
for legal assistance. 128 Other basic needs include rehabilitation for le-
122. Id. principles 33-42.
123. See U.N. Doc. A/RES/40134, Dec. 11, 1985, Declaration of Basic Principles of Jus-
tice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power. For a relevant discussion, see International
Protection of Victims, 7 NOUVELLEs ETUDES PENALES 1988 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed.
1988). See also Security Council Resolution 808 establishing the ICTY: S.C. Res. 808,
U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993); van Bo-
ven Principles, supra note 102.
124. As the van Boven Principles assert,
Every State has a duty to make reparation in case of a breach of the obliga-
tion under international law to respect and to ensure respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms. The obligation to ensure respect for hu-
man rights includes the duty to prevent violations, the duty to investigate
violations, the duty take appropriate action against the violators, and the
duty to afford remedies to victims. States shall ensure that no person who
may be responsible for gross violations of human rights shall have immunity
for liability for their actions.
van Boven Principles, supra note 102, principle 2.
125. See supra note 48 and sources cited therein.
126. van Boven Principles, supra note 102, principle 6.
127. Id. principle 8.
128. Id. principle 9.
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gal, medical and psychological care 129 and assurances of satisfaction
and guarantees of non-reputation, including the cessation of violations,
verification of the facts, official government restoration of the dignity of
the persecuted victim, apology and acceptance of responsibility, judicial
sanctions against the offenders, and prevention of the recurrence of
violations.130 These are minimum means of redress to give victims re-
muneration for the suffering they have experienced and provide them
with the basic needs for personal recovery and re-entry into society.
Article 8 of the Universal Declaration calls for the right to an effec-
tive remedy by the "competent national tribunals" in order to obtain re-
dress for violations of human rights. What if there exists no "competent
national tribunal" to offer such remedies? International law is now
evolving in anticipation of that situation with the drafting of an inter-
national convention for the creation of a permanent International
Criminal Court (ICC) during the summer of 1998.131 If adopted, sup-
ported and implemented, such an international criminal tribunal could
try accused perpetrators of "core crimes" (i.e., war crimes, genocide, and
crimes against humanity) that national governments, for one reason or
another, choose not to prosecute. 132 Key to the proposed ICC's operation
is the relationship between it and the legal institutions of states. This
relationship is to be guided by the principle of "complementarity," which
refers to the extent to which a domestic court may assert exclusive ju-
129. Id. principle 10.
'130. Id. principle 11.
131. See Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1 (Apr. 14, 1998). For commentaries on
salient facets of an earlier version of this draft, see generally OBSERVATIONS ON THE
CONSOLIDATED ICC TEXT BEFORE THE FINAL SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE,
13bis NOUVELLES ETUDES PENALES (Leila Sadat Wexler, ed., 1998). See also M. Cherif
Bassiouni, Establishing an International Criminal Court: Historical Survey, 149 MIL. L.
REV. 49 (1995); James Crawford, Prospects for an International Criminal Court, 48
CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 303 (1995); Sandra L. Jamison, A Permanent International
Criminal Court: A Proposal that Overcomes Past Objections, 23 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
419 (1995); Timothy C. Everred, An International Criminal Court: Recent Proposals and
American Concern, 6 PACE INT'L L. REV. 121 (1994).
132. See Christopher L. Blakesley, Jurisdiction, Definition of Crimes and Triggering
Mechanism, in The International Criminal Court: Observations and Issues before the
1997-98 Preparatory Committee; and Administrative and Financial Implications, 13 Nou-
velles Etudes Penales 1997 177 (Association International de Droit Penal, M. Cherif Bas-
siouni, ed., 1997). The notion of an international criminal court is not a recent one. See
DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Annex to the Report of the
Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, 31 Aug. 1951), 7 U.N. GAOR Supp. 11,
UN Doc. A/2136 (1952); REVISED DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT (Annex to the Report of the Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, 20
Aug. 1953), 9 U..N. GAOR Supp. 12, U.N. Doc. A/2645 (1954). For an insightful history
and compilation of documents detailing efforts to create such an international tribunal,
see FERENCZ, supra note 30.
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risdiction over a case relevant to the ICC, and vise-versa. 133 Once acti-
vated, this permanent international criminal court would come to sup-
plant the activities of the international tribunals currently adjudicating
crimes in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
A permanent ICC notwithstanding, domestic prosecutions of ac-
cused war criminals, where available and effective, are generally much
preferred. Even so, genuine attempts at any level to protect and enforce
human rights through prosecution of persons who commit serious viola-
tions of humanitarian law are significant and laudable. The success of
any tribunal, whether domestic or international, remains dependent on
the promulgation, interpretation, application and enforcement of the
law. Put tersely, the viability of both peace and justice rests on these
processes and the degree to which they are achieved.
VII. CONCLUSION
Fifty years ago, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was
adopted by the UN General Assembly as the common standard to which
all peoples and states should strive. In an ideal world, the rights and
conditions exhorted in the Universal Declaration would prevail. People
would coexist peacefully, cooperate, and exercise due diligence through
nondiscrimination in their everyday affairs. Miscreants would be ap-
prehended, prosecuted, and punished in accord with the rules of na-
tional and international law. Prescriptions for justice would be over-
riding guidelines for and considerations of law and policy. Every
responsible authority would be held accountable for his or her acts or
omissions. Article 8 of the Universal Declaration would be honored and
upheld.
But we do not live in an ideal world. We live in a world of disparate
sovereign states, governed by humans with selfish ambitions who per-
ceive, formulate and execute policies in the name and under the guise of
national interests, but often for their own private greed and personal
ambitions. In the course of this governing process, the fundamental
human rights of innocent persons are all-too-often brutally victimized
by individuals claiming to act in the name of the state. What makes this
situation all the more vile and repugnant is that in nearly all these
cases the perpetrators have been able to evade prosecution and pun-
ishment, even for the most horrendous of crimes. In cases of war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and acts of genocide-crimes that have been
deemed offenses against all mankind and the perpetrators of which are
branded war criminals and enemies of all mankind-most of the guilty
133. See Jeffrey L. Bleich, Esq., Complementarity, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT, supra note 132, at 231; Jeffrey L. Bleich, Esq., Cooperation with National Sys-
tems, in id. at 245.
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have gone uncharged, unprosecuted and unpunished. There has been
little remedy for the victims or their family survivors. Where justice
should prevail, the scourge of impunity has reigned.
Impunity, the exemption from punishment for violations of civil
and political rights, is multidimensional. Impunity rarely is generated
by purely normative considerations. Instead impunity stems from a
complex nexus of normative, circumstantial, and situational causes.
Impunity is not a construct normally found in positive law. The norma-
tive dimension of impunity is found in special national laws authorizing
impunity in certain circumstances, as well as in the practice of military
justice and codes of law. Impunity laws and the practice of military jus-
tice often conflict with international criminal law.
Certain facts and circumstances contribute to impunity. In many
developing countries, political traditions and strongly military domi-
nated civil societies prevail. The weaker a civil government and that so-
ciety, the deeper the potential intrusion of military justice into affairs
normally reserved for civilian justice. Such circumstances provide the
framework for encouraging impunity for military officials, as well as the
lack of a profound conviction that human rights violators must be
brought to justice.
Clearly, a duty exists for states to prosecute and punish persons
who commit the most serious human rights violations. This comes as
the logical extension of individual responsibility in international hu-
manitarian law concerning grave breaches, as first articulated norma-
tively in the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Thus, international legal obliga-
tions to punish grave human rights violations limit national discretion
with regard to impunity. Impunity laws, such as amnesties, are legally
limited in existing international criminal law. While sometimes politi-
cally convenient or expeditious, such laws may well be incompatible
with international criminal law. The international lawfulness of such
impunity laws will depend on the prosecutional performance of a state
in any specific case.
Key concerns remain, though. Salient among these is how victims
of serious human rights violations can enforce their rights to remedy by
punishment of the perpetrator. One of the crueler ironies of interna-
tional human rights protection is that the actual perpetrators of egre-
gious human rights violations nearly always escape punishment. Im-
plementation of the doctrine of individual criminal responsibility,
widely recognized since Nuremberg, should compel individual offenders
to accountability. Yet, the individual victim still lacks the fundamental
right to initiate proceedings against an alleged perpetrator.
Critical problems of compliance and enforcement remain. Reversal
of impunity through prosecution and punishment of perpetrators can
only come about if there exists the resolute political will of governments
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to do so. If governments are unwilling to comply with and enforce laws
against human rights violators, and if governments are willing to toler-
ate abuses and exacerbate conditions of impunity, then remedies for
victims will remain more fiction than fact, more sieve than substance.
That situation will render Article 8 in the Universal Declaration only so
much empty aspiration.
The fact is that international law is neither automatic nor self-
enforcing. Governments must make compliance work by exercising the
necessary political will to punish the guilty-whether it be the soldier
in the field who pulls the trigger, or the militiaman in the countryside
who rapes and pillages, or the officer who gave the orders to perpetrate
unlawful acts, or the leader who made the decision for his armed forces
to commit crimes against humanity. For human rights laws to be
meaningful, the governments of states must institute and implement
national and international laws, support and protect the national judi-
ciary, and uphold and carry out sentences against those who are con-
victed. To do otherwise is to emasculate the law and perpetrate impu-
nity. Until the requisite political will is demonstrated, particularly by
the Great Powers on the UN Security Council, the international law to
prohibit and punish war crimes, genocide, torture and crimes against
humanity will remain inert and ineffective. Regrettably, so too will the
ability of states to afford victims adequate remedies for human rights
offenses committed unjustly against them.
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